Value Investing is BACK - with Tobias Carlisle
In this episode, we delve into the world of value investing with Tobias Carlisle, the founder of The Acquirer's Multiple and author of the book 'The Acquirer's Multiple'. From his journey from a lawyer in Australia to a value funds manager in California, to his unique approach towards value investing, this conversation is a treasure trove of insights for anyone interested in the financial markets.
Topics Discussed
- Tobias Carlisle's journey from a lawyer in Australia to a value funds manager in California
- A discussion on the performance of Carlisle's ETF ZIG and its outperformance of S&P over the last three years
- The challenges and rewards of being a value investor in a market dominated by growth investing
- Insights into Carlisle's investment strategy, including his emphasis on fundamental performance over price action
- The role of patience and behavioral fortitude in value investing
- Carlisle's views on the future opportunities for value investing, particularly in the context of sector diversification
- Reflections on the recent Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting and the lessons learned from Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger
- Carlisle's personal investment mantra and his advice for navigating the ups and downs of the investing world
This episode is a must-listen for anyone interested in value investing. Tobias Carlisle's insights, drawn from his extensive experience and unique approach to investing, provide valuable strategies to navigate the financial markets. Whether you're a seasoned investor or just starting out, this conversation is sure to provide you with plenty of food for thought.
This is “ReSolve’s Riffs” – published on YouTube every Friday afternoon to debate the most relevant investment topics of the day, hosted by Adam Butler, Mike Philbrick and Rodrigo Gordillo of ReSolve Global* and Richard Laterman of ReSolve Asset Management.
*ReSolve Global refers to ReSolve Asset Management SEZC (Cayman) which is registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission as a commodity trading advisor and commodity pool operator. This registration is administered through the National Futures Association (“NFA”). Further, ReSolve Global is a registered person with the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority.
Transcript
As to the passives eating the world, I think at the
2
:margin, I think that's probably
what happens in any bull market.
3
:People go with what's been
working and the S& P 500 is
4
:the best performed asset class.
5
:Or asset, in the world over
that sort of period of time.
6
:You can get it for nine basis points.
7
:It's got Sortino ratio that
look like a hedge fund.
8
:You know, it's, it's an incredible
run for that and it can soak up
9
:a lot of assets, but I think that
this is true at every bull market.
10
:People invest in what,
what has been working.
11
:And the moment that that breaks down,
the money will go somewhere else.
12
:Mike Philbrick: All right,
welcome to another Resolve Riffs.
13
:Today we have an old friend with us,
Toby Carlisle from The Acquirer Funds
14
:and from The Acquirer's podcast and
blog and, I know you call it Value After
15
:Hours, your, your, uh, YouTube show.
16
:I like to, I like to think
of it as Value After Hours.
17
:Because your voice is just so calming
and, uh, and so value after dark.
18
:Like I think you might, you know,
I, I would contemplate submit to
19
:you for a name change to, value
after dark with Toby Carlisle
20
:Tobias Carlisle: Yeah, we might do that.
21
:Richard Laterman: has to be the accent.
22
:Mike Philbrick: yeah, so, so
congratulations on a fantastic
23
:year and last three years for
your ETF ZIG outperforming S&
24
:P on both of those timeframes.
25
:Fantastic work.
26
:Still flying under the radar though, as
many assets and, and geographical regions,
27
:whether it's gold, whether it's Argentina,
whether it's value, so many places are
28
:actually doing well and outperforming
S& P providing great diversification.
29
:Yet most people aren't, you know, really
allocating in any significant way there.
30
:So I know, I know we're kind of early
on beating this drum and what we beat it
31
:through all the way through the, the tough
times too, but, you know, hopefully people
32
:can take away some insights here from you.
33
:And, maybe before we get started, for
those of you who may not know you,
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:Toby, maybe give us a little bit of your
history, how you came to this point.
35
:I mean, going from, uh, A
lawyer down in Aussie to a value
36
:funds manager in California.
37
:Maybe map it out for us and
bring everybody else up to
38
:speed who might not know yet.
39
:Tobias Carlisle: Yeah, I started out.
40
:Thanks for that's very
kind introduction, Mike.
41
:Thanks very much for that.
42
:I always good chatting to you with a
big, the big lead in the big buildup.
43
:Uh, yeah, I was a lawyer.
44
:I was a mergers and acquisitions attorney.
45
:I was corporate advisory
is what we call it.
46
:So we did everything from capital
raising to acquisitions to board
47
:papers to like just whatever was
needed for mostly publicly listed
48
:companies, big, big private companies.
49
:I started in April 2000, which
was the very top of the dot com 1.
50
:0 boom and saw that all collapse,
and then saw the rise of activism and
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:private equity through those early 2000s.
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:And, at the same time as I was sort of,
you know, Papering these private equity
53
:acquisitions, which is a lot of work,
you know, there's lots of different
54
:layers of capital, debt, equity, prefs,
whatever might be in there, plus the
55
:acquisition and just there's so much
contracting, you'd end up with a tower
56
:of paper at the end of it and it would
cost millions of dollars of legal fees.
57
:At the same time, you can buy
exactly the same business for
58
:cheaper on the stock market.
59
:And at the time it was 8 a trade.
60
:I don't know what it is now, but it
was 8 for me to trade by the, by the
61
:same business for half the price.
62
:And then if you make a mistake
two days later, you can tip it
63
:out for another 8 round trip.
64
:And I had read enough sort of,
Buffett and Graham by that point
65
:to know that these things happen.
66
:You, you find, Pieces of businesses
that aren't trading for the full
67
:negotiated price on the stock market,
even though they might be worth more.
68
:And I just kind of fell in love with it.
69
:It was fun.
70
:And it was a good period for value.
71
:It was easy to buy things
who were undervalued and they
72
:just run almost immediately.
73
:And so I spent the first sort of five
years or so of my investing career.
74
:Doing pretty well with
deeply undervalued stuff.
75
:And that all sort of collapsed in, in
:
76
:and do it professionally at that point.
77
:So I set up a little fund in
Australia, had some pretty good
78
:returns out of the gate, but just
was never going to be a structure
79
:that could raise money in the States.
80
:My wife has, American we met when I was
working in San Francisco as a lawyer.
81
:And so we moved back to have kids
and I started the business here.
82
:And, it's been a tougher run for
value as everybody well knows.
83
:Those starting in, depending on how
you measure it, starting in:
84
:2015, somewhere in that period of time,
value really started underperforming.
85
:And I've got a friend, Mikhail
Samonov, he's done this analysis.
86
:He, he called it 200 years of value.
87
:And he said, this was the, you
know, that period through:
88
:was the worst underperformance
of value in 200 years of value.
89
:Clearly as you go back in time.
90
:The, the data is not as good, but
what is pretty clear from it is that
91
:you get these often associated with
some sort of technological boom.
92
:So the telegraph, the invention
of the telegraph was a big one.
93
:steamships was another big one and so
on over the last sort of 200 years where
94
:every time there's been an electronics
boom in the 60s, the dot com 1.
95
:0 boom, Whatever it
was that sort of com 2.
96
:0 social kind of boom
that we had through:
97
:And I guess now we've got a little
micro boom going on with the AI, but
98
:whenever we have these things, it tends
to be the story stocks that don't have
99
:a lot of fundamental value run and it
draws money away or it sort of leads
100
:the rest of the market to underperform.
101
:So that's, that's what
I've invested through.
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:And I know we're going to talk about
this a little bit, but I've definitely
103
:had to adapt from a more traditional
value to sort of a A different sort of
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:style of value to that practice now.
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:Mike Philbrick: Well, even I think
that was interesting in the, in
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:the, I know you make the pilgrimage
to Omaha each year and, you know,
107
:the Berkshire annual meeting.
108
:And so we're looking forward
to get some tidbits from that.
109
:But even in that, you know, I heard.
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:A lot of that, the evolution of
Warren's thinking, because they paid
111
:so much time to Charlie, and you know,
Charlie's thinking was a little bit less
112
:value oriented than Warren's thinking.
113
:And, and, you know, maybe you're alluding
to that sort of thing in your own journey
114
:as you have been, you know, managing
value assets in, in what has been a.
115
:It's been, you know, obviously there's
lots of stuff around this value, but if
116
:no one else is, is realizing that and kind
of beating a path to that door, it leaves
117
:you with, you know, lots of value for a
period of time that is less comfortable
118
:than having the realization right away.
119
:Tobias Carlisle: Well, I actually
think that's an interesting point.
120
:Cause I, I think that if you're relying
on, that was one of the big changes that
121
:I made was that through through really
it was through:
122
:2020 out of that sort of COVID low.
123
:Through until the end of 2020,
that was a very strange time.
124
:Everybody was at home with nothing to
do speculating on the stock market.
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:And so I saw like lots of extra
hits on my websites podcast and my
126
:social media grew really quickly,
even though I'm a value guy and I was
127
:well out of all of those names, I'm
still involved in the stock market.
128
:And so I was getting
attention for that reason.
129
:And the stuff that I would just
wouldn't touch with a 10 foot pole
130
:was the stuff that was running it.
131
:The stuff that I was holding
was suffering as a result.
132
:It wasn't clear, you know,
everybody knows these things are
133
:cyclical, but it's hard to believe
that it's cyclical in the moment.
134
:I thought, what if this
does go along forever?
135
:And I was listening to some of the
other smarter value guys who are
136
:a little bit more growthy than me,
listening to what they were saying.
137
:One of the criticisms that they
have had of the very deep value.
138
:So I would characterize myself as deep
value, which is I, I, tend to buy less
139
:good businesses at a big discount.
140
:That's sort of my, Objective rather
than a really great business at a fair
141
:price, which would be the way that
Buffett characterizes what he does.
142
:So I thought one of the criticisms that
was valid of what I did was that, aren't
143
:you just really relying on price action?
144
:To be the thing that bows you out.
145
:'cause we all know that if you form
a value portfolio, the market expects
146
:the earnings to fall or not perform
as well as the market earnings.
147
:And that tends to be what happens.
148
:It's just that they have overestimated,
how bad the returns are gonna be, and
149
:then the stock price recovers as a result.
150
:So it's this funny kind of behavior
where the, the earnings are actually
151
:going down, but the stock price is
going up because of the, the little
152
:window when you own the stock.
153
:And the reverse is true
for the growthy stuff.
154
:The market expects the earnings to
go up and they do on average go up.
155
:It's just that they disappoint the
market and the multiple comes down.
156
:But somebody said, you know, aren't
you just relying on price action here?
157
:And that's not very, that's
not very value like, is it?
158
:That's not very fundamental because
that's not what fundamental value guys do.
159
:And I thought that was a fair point.
160
:So I went back and I retooled what
I did and I looked at it and I made
161
:this assumption, what if we had to.
162
:Invest with no price performance.
163
:What will we be doing then?
164
:We're purely relying on
fundamental performance.
165
:What, what would I construct then?
166
:And so it made me, I leaned a
little bit more into quality.
167
:I made sure that when we
bought something, we'd get some
168
:compounding out of the reinvestment.
169
:So you need a reasonable return on
reinvestment, reasonable prospects
170
:for compounding reinvestment,
returns over a period of time.
171
:And then also for some yield.
172
:So some shareholder yield, which is.
173
:Dividends, buybacks, you know, hopefully
buybacks for undervalued things, but
174
:not not every management team does that.
175
:And I, I feel like I, I now think
in 2 distinct terms of value sources
176
:when I buy something, we're going
to get a return out of the yield.
177
:We're going to get a return
out of the compounding.
178
:I don't rely at all on the price action.
179
:I assume that price action is
going to catch up to us over time.
180
:And I think that's a pretty
safe assumption, but I
181
:don't expect it to at all.
182
:And I'd be quite happy for
my entry multiple and my
183
:exit multiple to be the same.
184
:And I'm purely rely on the
fundamental performance of
185
:the business over that period.
186
:So I think that that's a pretty
big change that I have built in.
187
:and I think that it's sort of yielded
results and I expect it to over time.
188
:So we, when the fund, when Zig first
launched, it was a long short fund.
189
:It 130 percent long, 30 percent
short, 30 names long, 30 names short.
190
:So a long name was 4%, short
name was 1%, rebalanced regularly
191
:without fear or favor, because
the shorts can be a problem.
192
:Shorts have got leverage in them.
193
:They can run the wrong way.
194
:You can get hurt.
195
:I invested through that period
where Melvin Capital blew up.
196
:I thought we did pretty well through
that period, but we were all, had, my
197
:great fear was always that we were going
to get caught in something that ran.
198
:So I'd make sure there was
no momentum in the stock.
199
:And I think that that's sort of for
the really growthy names that is there.
200
:That's their rocket fuel.
201
:Their mojo is all of that momentum.
202
:The moment the momentum gets out
of those stocks, the people aren't
203
:interested in playing with them anymore.
204
:It's like the toy just gets discarded.
205
:So you can look at the charts as
soon as the momentum goes in beyond
206
:or Peloton or any of those kinds
of names, they just disappear for
207
:a variety of not very interesting
kind of technical custody reasons we
208
:couldn't get as long as I want it to be.
209
:And so we were sitting at a
hundred long 30 short through.
210
:The beginning of 2020.
211
:So that helped us on the way down
and protect us a little bit, hurt
212
:us on the way back up in that mania.
213
:So 2020 wasn't a great year for Zig.
214
:And then in 2021 converted to
long only because I thought
215
:that there's some existential.
216
:Metaphysical risk with the shorts,
like even if they never actually blow
217
:up, there's always a risk that they
do kind of hope that the fund gets
218
:big enough one day that, you know,
it's, it's a big fund and then it's
219
:harder to short at that kind of size.
220
:So I thought, I'm going to take
this medicine at some point.
221
:It doesn't really align
philosophically with the way I am.
222
:So I'm going to change to long
only, which happened in:
223
:So since 2021, 2021 was a good year,
cause that was sort of the end of
224
:the, uh, The stock market run up 22
was the kind of, I thought it was
225
:the beginning of a big bust, but
ultimately it didn't turn out that way.
226
:And then 23, we had a really good year.
227
:I would not have expected it at all.
228
:I thought that the, all of the macro
economic indicators were terrible
229
:and really the lesson that I've
learned is I know nothing about
230
:macro and I'm just going to shut up
about macro and ignore macro forever.
231
:I think the market can fall over 50
percent at any given point in time
232
:and you should be able to survive it.
233
:But aside from that, macro
is just a waste of time.
234
:So I'm a long only value
investor, bottom up.
235
:I'm about as plain vanilla
as they come these days.
236
:Mike Philbrick: I love it.
237
:You hit on, you've hit on just one last
thing, Richard, and I'll let you jump in.
238
:But you hit a, you've hit on a point
that I have always kind of giggled at
239
:as I've heard various value investors
like Warren or others, you know, say
240
:market timing is not a thing you can do.
241
:And at the same time, they use
value sort of fundamentally driven,
242
:mechanisms in order to decide whether
to have cash on the sidelines or not.
243
:Whether to have more cash in the
sidelines than one normally would
244
:or not, or to invest more or
not, which is a form of timing.
245
:It's just timing by a
slightly different nature.
246
:So I'm glad you highlight that.
247
:That's kind of an, it's always
kind of a funny thing that I
248
:Tobias Carlisle: They might
say valuing rather than timing.
249
:They're valuing the market,
250
:Mike Philbrick: Fair enough,
which is a, an exposure mechanism
251
:Tobias Carlisle: I don't do that, but,
252
:but I'm just
253
:Mike Philbrick: totally get it.
254
:Totally.
255
:And you've, you've, you've,
you've answered the question
256
:too, for the, for the ZIG funds.
257
:Now, Richard, you've been,
you've been waiting patiently.
258
:You've got some things to say.
259
:So let me shut up now and let you, uh,
260
:Richard Laterman: I
have some things to ask.
261
:No, I'm just very curious.
262
:we hear about a lot about this
narrative that, you know, passive
263
:is eating the world and that that
might be one of the main reasons
264
:why there's been this incredible
bifurcation that's been lasting, guess,
265
:a couple of decades now with this
underperformance of value versus growth.
266
:So, I'm wondering, do you
subscribe to any of that?
267
:Do you see other reasons,
for this underperformance?
268
:Obviously, you've.
269
:Morphed and you've been alluding
to some of the ways in which you've
270
:adapted your style over the years to,
to sort of account for these changes.
271
:But I'm wondering, does it
even matter to your style?
272
:But have you gone down the rabbit hole
and trying to understand what are some of
273
:the mechanisms, structural mechanisms that
have led to this underperformance and this
274
:bifurcation and does it begin with this
passive eats the world sort of thesis?
275
:Tobias Carlisle: I am not a subscriber
to the passive eats the world thesis.
276
:And I will talk about that.
277
:But the first, just let me say
that the reason that I think that
278
:value has underperformed, you can
look at the relative value of value
279
:and growth as another alternative.
280
:So let's just say that quality
or growth, better businesses
281
:should command a premium price.
282
:Worst businesses should
command a discounted price.
283
:If everything was fair, that
would be what would happen.
284
:What tends to happen is there's
a little bit of mean reversion
285
:in business performance as well,
that I think a lot of people miss.
286
:Things just don't go to zero.
287
:When oil was trading at a negative
number, that's not a, that's not
288
:a signal to sell oil, if anything,
that's a signal to buy oil at that
289
:Richard Laterman: Don't
extrapolate at the extremes.
290
:Tobias Carlisle: That's right.
291
:And there's, there's, that's the original
paper, the Le Connachic Schliefer and
292
:Vishny paper from 1994, which is the
sort of alternative to the, efficient
293
:market theory, Fama French paper,
which is that all value is risk.
294
:The, behavioralist guys say,
no, no, no, it's not all risk.
295
:There's a behavioral thing going on.
296
:There's extrapolation.
297
:They extrapolate at the top.
298
:They extrapolate at the bottom and
mean reversion is a better bet.
299
:So I just, I'm a I bet on mean
reversion, not extrapolation.
300
:And I think that, if you looked in 2015
at value, the difference between the
301
:best businesses and the worst businesses,
that was, that was so squashed together
302
:because valued had such a great run
through the two thousands, everybody
303
:was trying to buy the undervalued stuff.
304
:And for a little bit of a premium,
you've got a much better business.
305
:And I think that that's why from 2015
until sort of the Today or the last
306
:few years, the better businesses, the
growthier stuff, the Nasdaq stuff has
307
:all had a great run because they were
too cheap and value was too expensive.
308
:And I think now the spread is very, very
wide and the spread has been closing, but
309
:the spread is still very unusually wide.
310
:It's still as wide as it was in
:
311
:the bottom, both of which went
on to have very good value runs.
312
:I think that That is really what has
driven the underperformance of value.
313
:It got too expensive in 2015.
314
:It's been working off
that being too expensive.
315
:And now the trend, now that the
trend keeps on going all the
316
:way to the point that value is
undervalued and growth is overvalued.
317
:So I think that we probably see some
mean reversion over the next decade here.
318
:That would be my bet.
319
:As to the, passives eating the
world, I think, I think at the
320
:margin, I think that's probably
what happens in any bull market.
321
:People go with what's been
working and the S& P 500 is
322
:the best performed asset class.
323
:Or asset in the world over
that sort of period of time.
324
:You can get it for nine basis points.
325
:It's got Sortino ratio that
look like a hedge fund.
326
:You know, it's an incredible run
for that and it can soak up a lot
327
:of assets, but I think that this
is true at every bull market.
328
:People invest in what,
what has been working.
329
:And the moment that that breaks down,
the money will go somewhere else.
330
:In any case, I don't care because I'm
not investing as we just, that discussion
331
:that I had earlier about the, you know,
not, not relying on the price performance.
332
:If I was an investor in the value stuff.
333
:And they bought back shares
and they're all cheap.
334
:They would, you know, axiomatically,
they must perform better.
335
:Like the cheaper they get
with the buyback mechanism.
336
:And I'll be the last person
with owning those stocks.
337
:Like if there's no bid and I
own all of those stocks, I'm an
338
:incredibly wealthy man, but there's
no longer any bid on the market.
339
:And so passive is eating the world,
but I've made a whole lot of money.
340
:It just doesn't like, it doesn't
logically, it can't work.
341
:I'm picking the pocket of those big funds
if they're, if they're not doing the
342
:fundamental diligence that I'm doing.
343
:I'm picking the pocket of SPY.
344
:Like anything they're leaving behind
is something that's worth owning.
345
:So I don't believe in, I think.
346
:Flows affected in the short term, but
ultimately in the long run, fundamentals
347
:are the thing that drive the market.
348
:Mike Philbrick: Money goes
where it's treated best.
349
:Richard Laterman: Yeah.
350
:Voting machine versus waiting
machine, I guess, is the, uh,
351
:is ultimately where you fall on.
352
:And so, yeah.
353
:And
354
:Mike Philbrick: just look, just
look at, look at oil, right?
355
:Right.
356
:Richard, just as a point, 2008 oil, the
energy sector of the S and P is 16%.
357
:It then bottoms at 2 percent
in:
358
:So underneath the surface, and this
is what I was alluding to earlier,
359
:there are changes going along.
360
:If you look in the resource space,
if you look in the emerging market
361
:space, look in the value space.
362
:You know, gold breaking out to
all time highs, you know, the
363
:materials world sort of again, you
know, highs not seen for 15 years.
364
:And everyone is still myopically focused
on the market cap weighted stocks of
365
:the United States, which are, you know,
obviously victims or, they also take
366
:advantage of the extreme momentum that
comes from a market cap weighting system.
367
:So I think under the surface, there's
still enough active managers Where money
368
:is, flowing under the surface on a longer
term timeframe to where it's being treated
369
:best on a return, whether it's cash
flow or some sort of more fundamentally
370
:driven, higher probable event that,
treats the money better, if you will.
371
:Tobias Carlisle: I think the
of:
372
:I think it's already happened.
373
:I think people who are waiting for it to
happen are completely missing the boat.
374
:The train is leaving
the station right now.
375
:It's already left.
376
:I mean, I think that's why I think
it's a little bit funny having these.
377
:These conversations, because I've been
living in a world where value has been
378
:up before for the last three years,
379
:Mike Philbrick: Yeah,
380
:Tobias Carlisle: know?
381
:Mike Philbrick: it's okay.
382
:I just, just to, to, you
know, put a point on that.
383
:I don't think we should
suggests the train has left.
384
:Usually these, these very large secular
movements are very large ships turning.
385
:And so, you know, if we look at those
moments in your career that you outlined
386
:earlier, Toby, and talking about 2000
easy, easy times, you know,:
387
:a little harder times, You know, it
seems as though easier times are upon
388
:us and, it's probably going to be, if
you zoom out and look at quarterly and
389
:annual data, you're going to see it and
you're going to see the outperformance,
390
:but over a day, a week, a month,
it's going to be shrouded in noise.
391
:Tobias Carlisle: Or even since the start
of this year, you would say this year has
392
:been more of a, that AI that kicked off
NVIDIA and AI has certainly reinvigorated
393
:all of that, the growthy stuff.
394
:And they've had a phenomenal year, many
of those guys and value has sucked wind
395
:a little bit this year, to be fair.
396
:Mike Philbrick: But that's what I mean.
397
:On a longer basis, step back, look
at a few quarters, look at annual,
398
:and you know, it's just there.
399
:Try to talk to people about it.
400
:My goodness, forget about it.
401
:Japan, you know, Argentina, these, you
know, significant outperformance of U.
402
:S.
403
:equities and people are like, don't care.
404
:and this is sort of indicative
of that:
405
:This is not, this is not new
406
:Tobias Carlisle: No, well
that's to be expected.
407
:Mike Philbrick: from history,
408
:Tobias Carlisle: People, people
tend to look through the rear vision
409
:mirror when they're investing.
410
:They look at things that have already
happened, extrapolate that forward.
411
:Fundamental investors are just looking at
the underlying fundamental data and trying
412
:to figure out what's going to happen.
413
:Are we getting a good deal buying
now without really knowing,
414
:expecting what, what can happen?
415
:That's sort of the way I think about it.
416
:I'm, I'm, whatever happens in
the market, I don't really mind.
417
:I'm going to be happy owning
the things that I own.
418
:Richard Laterman: so let's pull
on that thread a little bit.
419
:You're, you're alluding
to the, the, fundamentals.
420
:So you run a few, = stock
screening, processes.
421
:I know that you have a
service that you offer that.
422
:So I would imagine that does permeate
through your process, your investment
423
:process for your, , actively
managed stuff to some degree.
424
:What else goes into that process?
425
:Is the stock screening an initial
filtering and then do you overlay
426
:with some discretionary or are
there other elements to that
427
:that you can tell us about?
428
:Tobias Carlisle: So we look at the
domestic US equity market only.
429
:we got North America, so we pulled some
Canadian data as well, but it's, it's,
430
:well, the funds are only invested.
431
:Uh, Canadian data is excellent.
432
:And I think that value
really works well in Canada.
433
:Mike Philbrick: it really does.
434
:Tobias Carlisle: I don't know
why it works so well there.
435
:And it works better in Canada
than it does in the States.
436
:Mike Philbrick: Maybe all
the resource stocks that get
437
:their, their value upside down.
438
:Yeah.
439
:Tobias Carlisle: or they're just, they're
just not as picked over, but the, The US
440
:market is where I invest in for the funds.
441
:So I don't, don't buy, I only buy
US listed companies for the funds.
442
:And so I can scan all of the companies
for the amount of money that they're
443
:making, you know, the amount of
money making that relative to what
444
:they've got invested in the business.
445
:and so I, I am purely focused
on the financial statements.
446
:When I say I'm a quantum, I'm a lawyer.
447
:I'm not a, I don't have a, PhD from
Booth or from Wharton or like, I'm not
448
:a, I'm not a Chicago quant in that sense.
449
:I'm just a quant in the sense that
I prefer the financial statements
450
:to the story that people tell
themselves about these businesses.
451
:So I think that all of the questions
that you have about a business or
452
:about management can be answered in the
financial statements and so we look at a
453
:series of financial statements for every
company and we try to figure out what's
454
:happening, how much money are they making,
what are their prospects for growing,
455
:what are their prospects for paying
out pretty good shareholder returns.
456
:Try and find the best risk
adjusted opportunities from the
457
:set that have no blow up risk.
458
:So we're trying to take all the blow up
risk off and that's, that's a quite a
459
:few tests, but that's like, you know,
looking at statistical tests of fraud
460
:and earnings, manipulation and financial
distress and using all those sort of
461
:standard tests and then looking at various
other things just to see how management
462
:treats the financial statements.
463
:So once we've narrowed it down to,
uh, an investable universe for both of
464
:the funds, so ZIG is 30, DEEP is 100.
465
:names.
466
:Then among those names, we go into
a forensic diligence, which is just
467
:does the financial statement match
the economic reality of the business?
468
:Because there's a lot of discretion.
469
:For managers to make decisions, two
perfectly reasonable people can come
470
:to, can create two different financial
statements for the same business.
471
:Over time, they should largely
balance out, but you look at accruals
472
:of different assets and the way
that they depreciate and so on.
473
:You know, if you're an owner operator
style manager, you're probably
474
:running it to minimize tax when that
means minimizing reported earnings.
475
:If you're a public company CEO,
whose compensation is based on stock
476
:options and all of that sort of stuff,
you're trying to maximize earnings.
477
:And they're Two different
styles of running a business.
478
:My preference is that I want to be
with the owner operator type guy.
479
:And so we, know, the system
is set up to try and find
480
:investors and managers like that.
481
:And then, I'm doing a diligence
where I'm actively looking at how
482
:far away is what I would think that
the earnings should be from what
483
:the actual reported earnings are.
484
:And is there a trend in there?
485
:Do they tend to be consistently and
growing over reporting of earnings?
486
:Or is it the other way around?
487
:Are they consistently
under reporting earnings?
488
:Some of that is answered
in the cash flow statement.
489
:And then we form a portfolio based on
what I think are the best risk adjusted
490
:opportunities with no blow up risk.
491
:And that's, that portfolio is then
rebalanced on a quarterly basis.
492
:Mike Philbrick: How do you account for
the, you know, sectors and subsectors and,
493
:and sort of the value, being all in one
sector or largely in a couple of sectors.
494
:How do you go through that?
495
:Tobias Carlisle: Yeah,
496
:that's, that's,
497
:Richard Laterman: sizing, if
you can add that, how do you
498
:think about position sizing?
499
:Is it conviction weighting?
500
:How do you think about those?
501
:How do you think about
502
:Tobias Carlisle: yeah, so
that's a great question.
503
:So the thing about value is that
sectors and industries all get cheap.
504
:Everything in the industry
gets cheaper once.
505
:And if you're just purely trying
to maximize returns, you want to
506
:be fully invested as much as you
possibly can in that industry.
507
:There is the problem though, that
every now and again, you get things
508
:like for profit colleges where
for profit colleges all got cheap.
509
:But, you know, ultimately that
was an act of the administration
510
:to kind of wipe them out.
511
:And so if you invest in the for
profit colleges, there was no
512
:recovery from those investments.
513
:So I'm always conscious of that
possibility being out there.
514
:And I never know if I'm looking
at something is the reason, you
515
:know, and that could be insurers.
516
:When Obamacare was coming in,
you had United as the most as
517
:the biggest and the other four,
we're trying to combine together.
518
:How big a bet do you want to take in that?
519
:How, what will be the impact of Obamacare?
520
:I don't know at that point in time, but
I want some exposure to the industry.
521
:Cause I thought they were cheap and I
also thought there were opportunities
522
:in the merger arms going on there.
523
:So I try to limit the exposure to any
industry to 20 percent of the book.
524
:So we have a limit, which is six names
out of a 30 name portfolio and 20
525
:names in a two in a 100 name portfolio.
526
:So we're always limiting and then.
527
:We are equal weighting
at each rebalance point.
528
:So I've done a lot of research in
different ways of weighting using
529
:Kelly or, you know, all of the
different things that you can do.
530
:And I wrote a book called Concentrated
Investing, which is largely about that,
531
:trying to figure out how concentrated
or otherwise you want to get.
532
:I kind of found that for the ease
of calculation, 30 names is a good,
533
:is sufficient diversification.
534
:I think that the efficient
market guys come out at 30.
535
:They're trying to create a portfolio
that matches the market portfolio
536
:as cheaply as they possibly can.
537
:Graham says 30 names, all of these, I
think when you do the work somewhere
538
:between 20 and 30 names, you get rid
of all of your non diversifiable risk.
539
:And it's just asymptotically
trending towards the market.
540
:The question is, how can you outperform?
541
:How can you deviate from the market?
542
:So you're not randomly picking
names, you're picking them according
543
:to some system value or whatever.
544
:So 30 value names out of a universe of
1, 000 for Zig, and it's a universe of 2,
545
:000 for Deep, because it's roughly Russell
2, 000, roughly Russell 1, 000 universes.
546
:30 names for the Russell 1, 000,
100 names for the Russell 1, 000.
547
:2000 is 3 percent of
names or, uh, sorry, 0.
548
:3 percent of names or, or 0.
549
:5 percent of names.
550
:So I think that you're already
very concentrated, equal weight
551
:in that group ease of calculation.
552
:And I, I've found that, that,
that works perfectly well.
553
:Mike Philbrick: And that's the
difference, just to, so ZIG is more
554
:mid cap, large cap, and DEEP is
more maybe mid cap, small cap, or
555
:Tobias Carlisle: So that,
556
:Mike Philbrick: would you, is
that the main difference, or,
557
:Tobias Carlisle: That's also quite
an interesting question, but it's,
558
:it's Russell 1000 roughly for Zigg.
559
:So it's the largest 1000, which is
mid and large, but at the moment
560
:Morningstar has it as a small, that
the centroid is over the small.
561
:And the reason is through no, like I
haven't directed the portfolio to do this.
562
:It's just that as the market has got
more expensive, it seemed to get more.
563
:I really think the last few years of
rather than being sort of a value, market.
564
:It's really been a large over small
market rather than a sort of growth
565
:over value or however you want to
characterize expensive and value.
566
:It's been a large, not small market.
567
:Smalls have been absolutely smoked.
568
:And so the portfolio was, was a 40
million median about three years ago.
569
:And it's something like
eight in Zig at the moment.
570
:So that the market caps have come
in dramatically in Zig and also
571
:in Deep, which is Russell 2000,
the Centroid sits right off the
572
:bottom of the Morningstar Square.
573
:Like you can look at that box.
574
:it's in small and micro because, and
that's where I think the opportunities
575
:are all small and value, but particularly
the size for whatever reason that
576
:spiking interest rates sort of let
all of these smaller businesses,
577
:cause they don't have the same.
578
:They haven't termed out their debt as
well as the mid and large cap companies.
579
:So they, their debt is all,
they've already started paying
580
:the higher rates where the middle
large cap companies haven't had
581
:to roll some of their debt yet.
582
:They haven't had the bullets come through.
583
:Whereas and micro have, so they're
paying like 10 percent rates to
584
:borrow if they can get the debt.
585
:And so I think that's why they've
really stumbled and you can see
586
:it in their earnings reports.
587
:You can see that large cap
earnings have largely recovered.
588
:S& P 500 earnings have recovered
and have gone above their:
589
:Whereas mid and large are still trading
below their:
590
:are much compressed as a result.
591
:S& P 400, S& P 600, which is
mid and small trading at about
592
:15, 14 times depressed earnings.
593
:Whereas the large caps are at like 20,
21, 22 times pretty extended earnings.
594
:So to me, that says that if you
believe in mean reversion, the
595
:opportunities in the small and mid,
and if you look back, small and mid
596
:have traditionally traded at a small
Earnings, multiple, premium to large.
597
:And now they're at a big discount.
598
:So I think that'll flip
over the next few years.
599
:And that's, that's where the opportunity
is small and value particularly.
600
:Mike Philbrick: Yeah, when you hear
about the demise of the, uh, premium
601
:for small caps in, in the research.
602
:That takes a good solid, you know, decade
or more of, of underperformance to get
603
:that headline that, Hey, the large cap
or small cap value premium is dead.
604
:Or that market cap premium for
investing in smaller companies is dead.
605
:I kind of always, when I hear those,
you know, the data is changing.
606
:We have a hundred years of
data and it's now changing.
607
:I'm like, is it?
608
:Or are we just at one of those
extremes where it's going to revert
609
:and, go back to where it was?
610
:Tobias Carlisle: I agree with you that
there's highly likely to be a mean
611
:reversion in there, but I think that even
if you just look at the, if you look at
612
:the expected returns for the prices that
you're paying, the returns are higher in
613
:small and And mid than they are in large,
that I think they're considerably higher.
614
:So I think that my, my deep fund, because
it's cheaper, has a higher expected
615
:return at this point than Zig, which
is, can only choose from a slightly
616
:bigger universe, even though it's
exactly the same process in both funds.
617
:They're just selecting
from different universes.
618
:So I did really think that
the opportunities in small and
619
:value than, and then the smaller
is better than the bigger.
620
:Mike Philbrick: Now, how do you, how
do you trade some of that smaller
621
:micro and small cap, those positions
is it's probably not an issue now as
622
:the funds are sort of smaller and, and
they're, in their infancy and growing,
623
:but is there, is there a point at
which, you know, you're going to reach
624
:capacity in that, in that domain?
625
:Tobias Carlisle: Certainly,
it's going to reach capacity.
626
:I don't know where that level is.
627
:That's going to be an ongoing thing,
but that's, that's why it's 100 names.
628
:Um, so they're, they're
all fairly small positions.
629
:There's also, you know, if you're
running an ETF, you have Liquidity
630
:Risk Management Program and you also
have an NYSE market capitalization
631
:cut off of about 75 million.
632
:So it has to be a market cap
bigger than 75 and it has to be
633
:sufficiently liquid to trade.
634
:And so it has to qualify
on two different measures.
635
:So all of the names that are in
the fund qualify on those measures.
636
:And, you know, you're probably
leaving some return behind by
637
:not being able to pick up the
really small, really liquid stuff.
638
:But you know, there's a, there's
some risk being in that stuff
639
:if you're in a publicly traded
640
:Mike Philbrick: Oh yeah.
641
:And there's costs where you've got, you've
got slippage in those that is, that is
642
:not, yeah, it's, it's, it's significant.
643
:The bid ask spreads are large and
acquiring and disposing of have
644
:some significant slippage that
often will eat significantly into
645
:what can be actually realized.
646
:so you have to, you know,
it's a slower approach.
647
:It's a, uh, it's a slightly
different game to think through.
648
:and some
649
:Tobias Carlisle: moves in
those little fellas are crazy.
650
:I just, every now and again,
I check in just to see what
651
:those hundred names have done.
652
:And it'll be, you know, a few names that
are up 15 or 20 on the day and a few
653
:names that are down 15 or 20 on the day.
654
:And that's probably just, you know,
that's, that's not, there's no news.
655
:There's no event.
656
:That's just somebody trying to trade them.
657
:Mike Philbrick: Bob wanted
a boat and he's selling
658
:Tobias Carlisle: it.
659
:Mike Philbrick: some shares.
660
:Tobias Carlisle: it.
661
:Richard Laterman: alluded to a moment
ago about, sectors often becoming cheap
662
:altogether because of some sort of macro
catalysts or something along those lines.
663
:but you also said that you're, you're,
you're done or you, you, you, you try
664
:to shoot from, from making any macro
predictions because that's not your game.
665
:How do you account for trying to
diversify within the portfolio and
666
:not have overly, overly concentrated
positions on any single sector?
667
:Do you impose any constraints,
uh, from a sector perspective?
668
:How do you think about that problem?
669
:Tobias Carlisle: Yeah.
670
:There's a, there's a sector constraint.
671
:There's a industry sector constraint,
which is, and it depends on how we're
672
:defining industries and sectors,
but where it's no more than 20
673
:percent of the book in any industry.
674
:So that gives me enough exposure, I think.
675
:But it also protects us in the, in
the instance that it's all for profit,
676
:for profit colleges, for example,
which there's no recovery from.
677
:And then we're updating
on a quarterly basis too.
678
:So we're continuing to examine
either financial statements still
679
:supporting us being in this position
or have, what's the market, right?
680
:Because that's, that's
the way I think about it.
681
:We're, we're not, You know, it's,
there's some arrogance in saying the
682
:market is totally wrong about this
because of course the earnings and the
683
:underlying business can deteriorate.
684
:In which case, we've made a mistake.
685
:We've paid too high a price for
a business that's deteriorating.
686
:And that's what the market is often doing.
687
:It's forward looking.
688
:They know that these events are
coming and they're not yet reflected
689
:in the financial statements.
690
:So the way that I think about it is
we're either paying a price that reflects
691
:those worse expectations, in which case
we're probably, you know, if it, if it
692
:does manifest that they're getting worse
and now the opportunity doesn't look as
693
:great, we just take the position off and
move on to something else or the market
694
:has overestimated, it's over extrapolated
and there's a pretty big recovery when
695
:the next print comes in and it's not
as bad as everybody was expecting.
696
:And then, and then you're off
to the race and that's sort of
697
:what we're trying to achieve.
698
:but you know, I'm, I'm always,
I'm very aware there's a lot of
699
:avenues for making mistakes and
for blowing up in this business.
700
:And that's really the thing
that I'm most focused on.
701
:I just want to survive because
there's always another cycle coming.
702
:There's always a better cycle coming.
703
:Mike Philbrick: a war of
704
:Tobias Carlisle: is to, Yeah.
705
:you've got to be there.
706
:You've got to be there
for the good cycles.
707
:I mean, at some point we're going to
have a value cycle like we had in the
708
:early 2000s and it would just be a crying
shame to have missed out on it because
709
:the growth cycle beforehand was so
brittle and you didn't make it through.
710
:Right.
711
:But I think we're getting
close to a big value cycle.
712
:So I'm pretty excited.
713
:Mike Philbrick: Is there, is there any,
I know you mentioned that, you know,
714
:you're not really paying attention to
the global macro side of things, but
715
:are there any potential sort of risks
or opportunities that you see the sort
716
:of the pricing mechanisms where you're
like, okay, This group is really cheap
717
:or, you know, my, my screens are focused
over here and you can sort of see the
718
:macro overlay that would lead to that.
719
:Tobias Carlisle: I think that value, when
things get very cheap, that's a good time
720
:to be looking in that sector because it
says that the big macro event has happened
721
:and everybody's aware of it right now.
722
:Oil goes, oil goes negative.
723
:All of the oil may just get smashed
to smithereens or, you know,
724
:housing was another interesting one
before housing kind of took off.
725
:The thesis, what lumber
got very expensive.
726
:You know, when lumber had that crazy
run through, through COVID, all of the
727
:housing builders got smashed to pieces.
728
:And I, thought the housing
builders were way, way too cheap.
729
:They were also in a market where
there was a lot of under building.
730
:Because of the GFC, more than a
decade ago, we just haven't built
731
:as many homes in the States.
732
:And so there's going
to be demand for homes.
733
:Housing bills are cheap,
lumber being too expensive.
734
:That's clearly a short term problem
that's going to resolve itself over time.
735
:And the home builders
went on a pretty good run.
736
:I didn't foresee that sticking up
interest rates as rapidly as they did
737
:would make the premium between new
homes and, you know, Existing homes so
738
:much smaller, or in fact, it would flip
over where people would be, it would be
739
:cheaper to buy a new home than it would
be to buy an existing home because the
740
:homebuilders could give you the rate
buy downs and all that sort of stuff.
741
:And so those homebuilders have had this
sort of generational little problem.
742
:Period of trading.
743
:But that's one of the
nice things about value.
744
:I didn't see any of that happening.
745
:I just thought, well, home builders
are too cheap, but then of course,
746
:it's all of the macro that drives
all of the craziness that goes on.
747
:And I just, I just don't think.
748
:It's not that I'm ignoring it.
749
:I'll I'll watch it and
I'm naturally bearish.
750
:So I've.
751
:You know, I can see that there's a
yield curve inversion out there and, you
752
:know, there's a war going on in Russia
and there's some conflict in Gaza.
753
:There's, there's always conflict
and there's lots of good reasons
754
:to be nervous about stocks.
755
:It's just that I can go back over
the last decade cause I have been
756
:bearish over the last decade and I
can go through all the things that I
757
:was bearish about, that none of which
manifested into, you know, anything
758
:that happened in the stock market.
759
:So I just think macro is so hard.
760
:It's not that it's wrong and it's not
that it's worth paying attention to.
761
:It's just that it's so important.
762
:Impossible to predict the third or
fourth derivative knock on effect and
763
:how that will impact the stock market
that the energy devoted to it is
764
:just a little bit of a waste of time.
765
:So I'm a beneficiary.
766
:I think sometimes that something
gets cheap for a macro reason and
767
:I'll buy it for the macro reason.
768
:And I'm probably a beneficiary on the
other side, bailing me out of the position
769
:and making it work, but I'm largely
just ignoring it and saying, well,
770
:it's cheap now and now it's less cheap.
771
:And I'm a buyer.
772
:And now it's less cheap.
773
:That's how I think about it.
774
:Richard Laterman: It really does,
seem, I mean, historically, at
775
:least in the last couple of years,
it has been really a patience game.
776
:to be a value investor, which comes
with its own behavioral challenges.
777
:I mean, you end up having these
lumpy returns at times, right?
778
:You, you wait, for a long time until the
waiting mechanism of the stock market
779
:finally leans in the direction and you
have whatever catalysts are going to
780
:drive, the price up and you're going to
realize that value in the business that
781
:you've, uh, or the businesses that you
have been, selecting in your portfolio,
782
:which kind of jives a little bit with the
experience that CTAs and trend followers
783
:have had, which is kind of our side of
the ledger here, where oftentimes you
784
:do get these lumpy return profiles.
785
:How do you think through that behavioral
challenge for yourself as a manager,
786
:but also for some of your stakeholders
and your investors when you're talking
787
:to Some of your, to your allocators
and you're, you're, you're pitching
788
:them this fund, you account for that,
behavioral, difficulty and, and, and,
789
:and sort of the, the, the fortitude
that one must have in order to stick
790
:to, because, uh, I find that value.
791
:is one of the more intuitive
things one can get behind on
792
:from an investing standpoint.
793
:You buy something that is below
its intrinsic value, and then you
794
:wait for that value to realize.
795
:But you know, a quarter goes by, a couple
years go by, and it's still not happening.
796
:And, and with our attention spans
growing shorter and shorter with, with
797
:all the social media and all these
apps, how do you think through all that?
798
:Tobias Carlisle: I, I think that again,
that's, the single most important
799
:question to answer as an investor.
800
:I think the more time that you spend in
the market, the more you realize, and I
801
:talk about this with Jake Taylor, who's
my co host on Value After Hours, it's
802
:amazing how many of these little stock
market bubbles, these little things
803
:occur and they're just, everything gets
so hot and everybody's so interested in
804
:this one thing for about three months.
805
:And then it's just, you
know, completely back.
806
:Back page of the paper thereafter.
807
:And if you can just not participate
in it for the first three
808
:months, then it looks silly.
809
:Like in the fourth month, you
look back and you think, how did
810
:people get so, get into this.
811
:And then I look at, I look at names
like, so Dillard's, Ted Weschler's
812
:one of Warren Buffett's investing.
813
:Lieutenants.
814
:hasn't done, hasn't, he's underperformed
the stock market since he started
815
:investing for, for Buffett.
816
:But he, he's had a couple
of very good picks.
817
:And one of them was Dillard's
DDS, which is still out there.
818
:And it's one of the companies
that I hold now as well.
819
:Dillard's is a retailer, retailer
got, all the retailers got smashed to
820
:pieces over the last five or 10 years.
821
:Dillard's was one of them.
822
:Dillard's got way too cheap.
823
:It was in all of my screens.
824
:and I'd buy it and sell it.
825
:And buy it again and sell it again.
826
:Cause you know, just as it sort of
bounced around a little bit, but it didn't
827
:really go anywhere for five or six years.
828
:And then through COVID, whatever it was,
the stimulus, whatever it was, it took
829
:off and it 10 bagged in about a year.
830
:And now it's up about 18
times from where he put it.
831
:I think he doesn't have it anymore, but
that 6 percent stake that he bought is
832
:worth like 360 million and it's an 18
bagger since he put that position on.
833
:And all of it happened in a
very short period of time.
834
:So the compound annual growth rate for
the holding period or the IRR for the
835
:holding period is like 36 percent plus.
836
:Over the seven years, but it's
really like only a handful of years
837
:that have delivered the return.
838
:So I'm just, I see those things
and I think that's a good, that's
839
:a good reminder just because the
market doesn't recognize this.
840
:Initially, what we're focused
on is the fundamentals.
841
:And I, at the, at the beginning
of this, I sort of started talking
842
:about that a little bit, but
that's sort of what it means.
843
:Like ignore the price action,
stay completely focused on the
844
:underlying fundamental performance.
845
:And if the fundamental performance
is trending in the right
846
:direction, then everything's good.
847
:Just.
848
:Just.
849
:stay cool.
850
:And so I've definitely found
myself, I've, I've stepped back
851
:from social media a fair bit.
852
:There's not a lot of utility
in it for me because it's just
853
:way too short term focused.
854
:So I put the positions on, we
rebalanced in a quarter, which means
855
:I'm going to get another quarters.
856
:Financial statements, we'll update
all of our models, we'll form up our
857
:ideal portfolio, and then at the end
of the quarter, we'll look at the
858
:differences between the ideal portfolio
and what we're currently holding in
859
:Zig, and we trade to make the Zig's
portfolio look like the ideal portfolio.
860
:And that's the process.
861
:So it's not a lot of, um, it's
not a lot of opportunity for me to
862
:overtrade or anything like that.
863
:I, I sort of just stick to the process
and I don't worry about it too much.
864
:'cause now I, I, I trust it too.
865
:I've been doing it for long enough
that I know that if we buy cheap and
866
:good, it will work out over time.
867
:Even though, you know, you can
have a look at the returns.
868
:In 2021, it was like a,
it was a pretty big year.
869
:It was like a 37% year, but then
in:
870
:and 23 is like an up 30% year.
871
:And then this year's like up
six or something like that.
872
:And we're underperforming a little
bit, but that's what happens.
873
:It's, it's clumpy get.
874
:Even though the portfolio is going forward
all the time, it's only reflecting the
875
:stock price sort of in fits and starts.
876
:That's okay.
877
:Mike Philbrick: The, the idiosyncratic
lightning strikes a few spots
878
:of the portfolio, creates some
returns or rebalancing happens.
879
:Then, then, uh, you know, you're
waiting for For those, those
880
:lightnings in a bottle again.
881
:And, so when you're doing it though,
are you sort of at the end of each
882
:month, looking back at the quarter,
whatever, whoever reported in that
883
:particular quarter and updating
there, or is it just literally, you
884
:know, four times a year type thing,
885
:Tobias Carlisle: Now it's the, the
portfolio, the, there's a model
886
:portfolio that's updated all the time.
887
:It's pulling in all of the new reporting.
888
:and at the end of the quarter,
the model portfolio will have
889
:deviated from what it was.
890
:Zig holds because there's some,
it's just turnover in the positions.
891
:It's force ranking all the
positions all the time.
892
:And so we'll trade to make the
Zig's portfolio or Deep's portfolio
893
:look like the model portfolio.
894
:Richard Laterman: Oh, so it
is a quarterly rebalancing.
895
:So you are only rebalancing
896
:Tobias Carlisle: yes, yeah, yeah.
897
:And I tested that.
898
:I've tested, you know, the more
you rebalance, you, you, you're
899
:getting a lot more friction, you're
getting a lot more costs and you
900
:find that there are things that they
just move in and out all the time.
901
:So you buying and selling this
one thing over and over again,
902
:that still happens on a quarterly
basis, just less, less regularly.
903
:But you also got that, you know,
Corey Hofstein had that great, paper
904
:where he identified all of that timing
luck, all of that rebalancing luck.
905
:And I had been aware of that as a
You know, anybody who does a lot of
906
:backtesting, you become aware that
if you start the portfolio in one
907
:January and you rebalance yearly in one
January, you get much better returns.
908
:And if you started in September and
you rebalance it in September without
909
:sort of knowing why, and if you started
in March and you get a rebalance,
910
:it's really close to that 2009 low,
the returns are like twice as good
911
:as if you rebalance in September.
912
:So there's clearly, I want to be able to.
913
:eliminate as much of that timing
rebalance luck as I can without
914
:incurring all of those additional
sort of frictional trading costs.
915
:And I think quarterly, you know,
you probably don't need to trade
916
:quarterly, probably yearly is
enough, but it just, it captures that
917
:timing rebalance luck sufficiently
that I think quarterly is okay.
918
:Quarterly is the number.
919
:Richard Laterman: And stepping away
a little bit from the, the systematic
920
:process and, and just kind of putting
your, your discretionary hat on a
921
:little bit, what are some of the
things that are gotten you excited on
922
:a, on a micro level or sector level?
923
:What are some of the things that if
you were inclined to sin a little,
924
:like as a value investor, looking
at all these companies and looking
925
:at the opportunities from a cyclical
standpoint, you just, described yourself
926
:as excited or growing the, becoming
more excited with the opportunities,
927
:but the forthcoming opportunities for,
value as a whole, what are some of the
928
:things that are getting you excited?
929
:Tobias Carlisle: Well, one of the
things that I do is I track the book.
930
:So I know what the book is.
931
:You know, I know what the expected
return is across the book.
932
:Cause I have a calculation for
each name where I know what the
933
:fundamental expected return is.
934
:So when the fundamental expected
returns going up, I feel better when
935
:it's going down, I feel worse, but when
it's going down, it's outperforming.
936
:And when it's going up,
it's underperforming.
937
:So I have managed to kind of train myself
to feel better when returns are worse
938
:because the forward returns are better.
939
:And so I think the forward
returns are better now.
940
:We've got to concentrate, you
know, we just tend to be buying
941
:lots of We're deep value.
942
:So it means we're always going to
be in, we're going to be in steel.
943
:We're going to be in coal.
944
:We're going to be in
oil and gas and energy.
945
:Um, we buy little busted industrials
that I think can do a little bit better.
946
:I have a little bit of trouble
distinguishing between them,
947
:honestly, because they all
have idiosyncratic problems.
948
:And the reason that they're in
the portfolio is because they
949
:have idiosyncratic problems
and they work their way out.
950
:If I was going to sin and be
discretionary, I'd be much more in
951
:things like probably I'd look at
something like, um, Starbucks or
952
:something that's, you know, had a
pretty big stumble, but ultimately, you
953
:know, that's a pretty Good business.
954
:I like businesses like Shopify.
955
:I think Shopify is an incredible business.
956
:I mean, I'd be out there buying all those
kinds of names, knowing that the way to
957
:own these things is to buy a little bit
now and just, you just don't even worry.
958
:That's like a 10 year position,
10 year plus position and you just
959
:let them run and let the underlying
business kind of figure itself out.
960
:But I would like, you know, really
good businesses after they stumble.
961
:I don't, I'm not so much of a speculator
that I'd go in and, you know, I
962
:wouldn't be trying to like, Time oil
or time coal or anything like that.
963
:Mike Philbrick: it's a little bit
more opportune quality type stuff, a
964
:little bit more in the direction of,
965
:Tobias Carlisle: Probably Buffett.
966
:Yeah.
967
:More in the direction of Buffett.
968
:Cause I do think that that's one
of the things that I just as I've
969
:tested, you know, I just turned
off my sell rules and so just buy.
970
:And just see what happens
over a full period of time.
971
:And it's kind of, it's interesting the
way that these things, they get, you
972
:start with 30 names and you can look
forward 25 years of these 30 names and
973
:you end up with this portfolio at the end.
974
:And it tends to be, it's heavily
concentrated in the things that are work.
975
:But if you start with 30 names, heavily
concentrated might be a 5 to 8 percent
976
:position, which I would think is a.
977
:If a position has worked its way up to
that, it may have earned that right to
978
:be that sort of size in the portfolio
and it'll all be stuff that's worked.
979
:So your positions will, it'll
be Apple, Microsoft, Starbucks.
980
:You have this portfolio that looks like a
Kelly betting value investors portfolio,
981
:even though it's just completely, you
know, the system has selected these names
982
:and it's just allowing time to work.
983
:Means that the ones that compound
are the better businesses.
984
:And the ones that don't
work just disappear.
985
:You know, they're rounding areas,
rounding areas or they're trivial.
986
:The interesting thing is how
much capital they throw off.
987
:So buying on a free cash flow basis,
holding for five, you know, the
988
:yield across the portfolio could
be 10 or 15 percent at inception.
989
:You hold that for five years, half
of that comes back, half of it
990
:Gets reinvested in the businesses.
991
:You find that you've got like a
third of your portfolio capital
992
:back after five years and you've
got to reinvest it anyway.
993
:So I think that you end up being
quite it's a Buffett's you're kind
994
:of imposing this Buffett's style,
cadence and, investment style on
995
:yourself just by virtue of the
fact that you have this never sell
996
:and own cheap quality stuff.
997
:You,
998
:Mike Philbrick: Beat your winners to
death, which is what you'd be doing here.
999
:You'd be saying, well, I'm not going
to sell my losers either, but they are,
:
00:51:04,773 --> 00:51:10,243
asymptotically going to approach zero or
hit zero, leaving the successful pieces
:
00:51:10,243 --> 00:51:14,713
of the portfolio, which were just well
timed purchases of what happened to be
:
00:51:14,713 --> 00:51:17,973
successful companies because you bought
them with that, those characteristics.
:
00:51:18,238 --> 00:51:18,688
Tobias Carlisle: That's right.
:
00:51:19,123 --> 00:51:19,403
Mike Philbrick: Yeah.
:
00:51:19,403 --> 00:51:19,683
Yeah.
:
00:51:19,683 --> 00:51:21,853
Keep your winners people
beat the hell out of those.
:
00:51:22,843 --> 00:51:23,723
Sell your losers.
:
00:51:24,476 --> 00:51:24,686
Richard Laterman: When
:
00:51:24,721 --> 00:51:25,781
Tobias Carlisle: not
what Zigg does though.
:
00:51:25,781 --> 00:51:26,301
That's not what Zigg
:
00:51:26,396 --> 00:51:27,406
Mike Philbrick: No, I understand.
:
00:51:27,406 --> 00:51:27,646
Yeah.
:
00:51:28,021 --> 00:51:28,281
Tobias Carlisle: sorry,
:
00:51:28,406 --> 00:51:31,923
Richard Laterman: through, thinking
through on a sort of longer term hold
:
00:51:31,923 --> 00:51:37,229
and, and, your, two strategies in the
deep value space, do they comprise
:
00:51:37,239 --> 00:51:40,109
a hundred percent of what you're
investing for yourself personally?
:
00:51:40,329 --> 00:51:44,529
And the reason for why I ask is, how
do you think about dealing with like a
:
00:51:44,929 --> 00:51:49,689
:are difficult for stocks as a whole,
:
00:51:49,689 --> 00:51:53,969
even though you might be, you might
have a large margin of safety for some
:
00:51:53,969 --> 00:51:55,099
of the businesses that you're holding.
:
00:51:55,099 --> 00:51:58,799
And so they might in relative terms
be outperforming the S& P or some of
:
00:51:58,799 --> 00:52:00,879
your other benchmarks in a downturn.
:
00:52:00,879 --> 00:52:04,609
But do you think about some
complementarity, on a style basis,
:
00:52:04,919 --> 00:52:07,909
you know, other diversifiers,
anything along those lines?
:
00:52:08,704 --> 00:52:10,234
Tobias Carlisle: I have a
lot of cash because I need a
:
00:52:10,234 --> 00:52:12,048
lot of, float in my business.
:
00:52:12,538 --> 00:52:16,251
And so I need, because I'm a small
business guy, no other source of income.
:
00:52:16,251 --> 00:52:19,331
I have float in the business and
I have float personally as well.
:
00:52:19,361 --> 00:52:19,831
So that's a lot.
:
00:52:19,861 --> 00:52:22,711
I have a lot of cash relative to
the assets that I have, but I have
:
00:52:22,711 --> 00:52:26,288
all of my investable assets in
Zigg and Deep because I just think
:
00:52:26,288 --> 00:52:27,748
that a manager should do that.
:
00:52:27,778 --> 00:52:29,903
And I think that, That
won't always be the case.
:
00:52:29,913 --> 00:52:33,393
I think if we got massive outperformance
for an extended period of time, then
:
00:52:33,393 --> 00:52:36,263
it would be okay to take some of
that off and, and mess around with
:
00:52:36,293 --> 00:52:38,883
some other things, just to try to
be a little bit more established
:
00:52:38,883 --> 00:52:40,043
and careful for my family.
:
00:52:40,043 --> 00:52:43,259
But at this point it's, I feel like
I should be eating the dog food.
:
00:52:43,259 --> 00:52:46,069
Not that I need any more focus on
it than I already have, but I just
:
00:52:46,069 --> 00:52:48,329
feel like I should be participating
along with everybody else.
:
00:52:49,398 --> 00:52:52,578
I think that the prospects for these
companies are always pretty good.
:
00:52:52,578 --> 00:52:57,671
I look back through, you know, we've,
an run this data back through::
00:52:57,791 --> 00:52:59,171
It's not forever.
:
00:52:59,231 --> 00:53:01,811
There's lots of other period things
that have happened outside of that, but
:
00:53:01,811 --> 00:53:07,531
even through the seventies these things
did okay because it's, this is the kind
:
00:53:07,536 --> 00:53:11,491
of strategy that does do well for, for
more inflationary period like that.
:
00:53:11,821 --> 00:53:15,151
That's not to say you can't have
some sickening drawdowns through
:
00:53:15,151 --> 00:53:17,221
that period of time, but I do
have some cash that I would.
:
00:53:17,993 --> 00:53:18,873
Opportunistically deploy.
:
00:53:19,143 --> 00:53:21,603
I'll just tell my wife that
we're, we're going to be
:
00:53:21,603 --> 00:53:23,053
investing in the, in the market.
:
00:53:23,053 --> 00:53:25,143
It's not a lot where we're going
to be buying something right now.
:
00:53:25,143 --> 00:53:27,023
So we can't do anything
else for a little while.
:
00:53:27,583 --> 00:53:28,463
She's all right with that.
:
00:53:28,553 --> 00:53:29,383
She understands.
:
00:53:29,803 --> 00:53:30,203
Mike Philbrick: Love it.
:
00:53:30,596 --> 00:53:33,766
The value investing life is a
critical component of investment
:
00:53:33,866 --> 00:53:34,806
Tobias Carlisle: she really is.
:
00:53:34,816 --> 00:53:35,686
She really is.
:
00:53:36,419 --> 00:53:37,379
She knows what she got into though.
:
00:53:37,499 --> 00:53:38,429
She, she understood.
:
00:53:38,789 --> 00:53:40,059
I was, I've been doing
this before I knew her.
:
00:53:40,816 --> 00:53:41,326
Mike Philbrick: I love it.
:
00:53:41,613 --> 00:53:44,533
I'm wondering now if we could, maybe
switch gears over to Omaha, but
:
00:53:44,563 --> 00:53:47,603
Richard, before we do that, do you
have any final thoughts of, cause
:
00:53:47,603 --> 00:53:48,673
you were pulling some threads there.
:
00:53:48,673 --> 00:53:49,403
So I want to make sure you've
:
00:53:49,563 --> 00:53:50,553
Richard Laterman: No, let's go forward.
:
00:53:50,943 --> 00:53:51,303
Let's go to
:
00:53:51,383 --> 00:53:51,973
Mike Philbrick: All right.
:
00:53:52,773 --> 00:53:53,103
Yeah.
:
00:53:53,103 --> 00:53:57,769
So you're, you usually go down
and attend the pilgrimage to
:
00:53:57,799 --> 00:54:00,096
the Berkshire annual meeting.
:
00:54:00,096 --> 00:54:02,206
And I understand you
did this year as well.
:
00:54:02,426 --> 00:54:03,596
How, how was it Toby?
:
00:54:03,596 --> 00:54:05,686
And what was, what's the
good, the bad and the ugly?
:
00:54:05,926 --> 00:54:07,609
Tobias Carlisle: Well, this
was the Charlie Munger passed
:
00:54:07,609 --> 00:54:08,429
away at the start of the year.
:
00:54:08,429 --> 00:54:09,889
So it was the first year without Charlie.
:
00:54:09,889 --> 00:54:11,079
So that was kind of poignant.
:
00:54:11,089 --> 00:54:11,469
He.
:
00:54:11,671 --> 00:54:14,521
Buffett did turn and say, you
know, he often gets Charlie
:
00:54:14,521 --> 00:54:15,491
to chime in on something.
:
00:54:15,491 --> 00:54:17,301
He said, he turned and he
said Charlie at one point.
:
00:54:17,311 --> 00:54:21,051
So he said, I've been, I've done, I've
gone to do that two or three times.
:
00:54:21,101 --> 00:54:22,541
But that's, you know,
it's kind of slipped out.
:
00:54:23,021 --> 00:54:26,621
And then he had Greg Abel, who's the
chief executive officer, who's also
:
00:54:26,691 --> 00:54:28,924
taken over the equity portfolios.
:
00:54:28,924 --> 00:54:32,144
And so it wasn't the two other
guys who had been sort of tagged
:
00:54:32,144 --> 00:54:32,904
at the moment, it looks like.
:
00:54:33,248 --> 00:54:37,358
The CEO of who he was Mid-American,
but now he's CEO of the whole thing.
:
00:54:37,358 --> 00:54:39,808
And he's also looking
after the equity portfolio.
:
00:54:40,258 --> 00:54:45,858
He seems to me like he's very smooth,
very controlled, very high EQ kind of guy.
:
00:54:45,858 --> 00:54:48,858
And he, he concluded one of the
things that he had said with, uh,
:
00:54:48,858 --> 00:54:51,498
nothing further to add, which was
a very famous Charlie Munger one.
:
00:54:51,503 --> 00:54:53,208
He always used to say that,
which the crowd loved.
:
00:54:53,738 --> 00:54:54,278
So I thought.
:
00:54:54,571 --> 00:54:55,981
I think they're doing the transition.
:
00:54:56,021 --> 00:54:59,381
I think there's probably a transition
going on now from Buffett to Abel.
:
00:54:59,461 --> 00:55:06,261
Buffett's, you know, phenomenally
articulate and thoughtful 93 year old man.
:
00:55:06,301 --> 00:55:10,821
But at 93, you can hear how fast
he used to talk when he was in
:
00:55:10,821 --> 00:55:12,221
his 60s and younger than that.
:
00:55:12,261 --> 00:55:14,661
You know, he sounds like you're
listening to a podcast on 1.
:
00:55:14,721 --> 00:55:15,691
5 times speed.
:
00:55:16,341 --> 00:55:18,401
And now he doesn't speak as
fast as that and it takes some
:
00:55:18,688 --> 00:55:20,584
diversions to make the point.
:
00:55:21,151 --> 00:55:24,281
So I thought from that perspective,
there's, there's a transition going on.
:
00:55:24,281 --> 00:55:25,081
That was what I took away.
:
00:55:25,081 --> 00:55:28,494
But the other, just outside of that,
I think that, there are principles of
:
00:55:28,554 --> 00:55:32,811
investing, that I learned from them that
I think I've only grown to appreciate
:
00:55:32,811 --> 00:55:34,081
why they're so important over time.
:
00:55:34,081 --> 00:55:37,201
And one of them is, and
I've, I've written a book.
:
00:55:37,201 --> 00:55:39,951
I've given this, it's with, uh,
it's with a publisher now to decide
:
00:55:39,951 --> 00:55:42,921
whether we do it or not, but it's
basically looking at some of the
:
00:55:43,216 --> 00:55:44,926
underappreciated aspects of what they do.
:
00:55:44,926 --> 00:55:47,996
And I think that one of them is this
idea of, you know, they, they'd look
:
00:55:47,996 --> 00:55:52,033
at character as one of the elements
of people who they do business with.
:
00:55:52,033 --> 00:55:55,069
It's hard to understand why as a
younger, or I just didn't really
:
00:55:55,069 --> 00:55:56,349
understand why it was so important.
:
00:55:56,349 --> 00:55:58,799
I mean, it's just, you're looking for
opportunities wherever you can get them
:
00:55:58,799 --> 00:56:01,049
when you, when you're young and hustling.
:
00:56:01,879 --> 00:56:02,489
And.
:
00:56:02,669 --> 00:56:05,489
It's only after you've been burned a
few times that I think that you realize
:
00:56:05,489 --> 00:56:08,639
how important character is in business
partners and other things like that.
:
00:56:08,659 --> 00:56:10,359
So that was a, that's an interesting one.
:
00:56:10,359 --> 00:56:12,533
And the other one is just
that you cannot blow up.
:
00:56:12,583 --> 00:56:17,686
You just have to be able to survive every
single market environment that you see,
:
00:56:17,696 --> 00:56:21,756
because you get, you know, Berkshire has
famously underperformed for long stretches
:
00:56:21,756 --> 00:56:23,716
of time and they haven't done very well.
:
00:56:24,286 --> 00:56:29,246
In others, there's always a magazine
cover that will let the world know
:
00:56:29,246 --> 00:56:30,646
at the time Buffett's lost it.
:
00:56:30,706 --> 00:56:32,756
And then it's often, you know,
it's close to their bottom.
:
00:56:33,316 --> 00:56:36,376
They're just about to go on a
really great run just after that.
:
00:56:36,386 --> 00:56:39,096
And I think that's true
of most strategies.
:
00:56:39,646 --> 00:56:45,234
A lot of the ways that my, fund works is
we're in a industry that's beaten up and
:
00:56:45,254 --> 00:56:48,894
some of the people in the industry leave
because it's just, they've either got too
:
00:56:48,894 --> 00:56:52,284
much leverage and they can't, they can't
make it or business is just too tough.
:
00:56:52,294 --> 00:56:55,654
There's easier money elsewhere and
they move away and then they get these
:
00:56:55,664 --> 00:56:57,244
super normal returns in the industry.
:
00:56:57,244 --> 00:56:59,584
And that's what I'm trying to
capture the super normal returns.
:
00:56:59,584 --> 00:57:00,644
It's true.
:
00:57:00,644 --> 00:57:04,014
Also, investing in a value
portfolio, you get these, you pay.
:
00:57:04,684 --> 00:57:06,774
You blow up, you miss the
bit that comes afterwards.
:
00:57:06,814 --> 00:57:10,834
So I think that that has been their
sort of underappreciated strength that
:
00:57:10,874 --> 00:57:14,834
they just muddle through in the bad
times, do really well in the good times.
:
00:57:14,844 --> 00:57:18,198
And I think for me, those are the, those
are the things that I really take away.
:
00:57:18,228 --> 00:57:21,341
Those two sort of principles,
do good, do, with good people
:
00:57:21,341 --> 00:57:23,261
and, and survive for a bad time.
:
00:57:23,261 --> 00:57:24,431
So you come out on the other side,
:
00:57:25,186 --> 00:57:27,836
Mike Philbrick: I'm interested as a lawyer
that you didn't pick up on that earlier.
:
00:57:27,836 --> 00:57:31,316
I mean, given that the other parts of
the firm may have been involved in,
:
00:57:31,346 --> 00:57:36,899
in the negotiations between those who
lack character in certain, uh, business
:
00:57:36,899 --> 00:57:37,319
dealings
:
00:57:37,544 --> 00:57:38,954
Tobias Carlisle: you might think
that you can paper over it.
:
00:57:39,014 --> 00:57:42,671
Like, I, I, I wouldn't have thought
you, some people regard the contract
:
00:57:42,671 --> 00:57:43,931
as like the ticket to the fight.
:
00:57:43,991 --> 00:57:45,911
You know, that's like, that's
where we're getting started.
:
00:57:45,911 --> 00:57:48,494
Some people are, are trying to find
their way through it as you're drafting
:
00:57:48,494 --> 00:57:50,504
and other people are like, well
that's the spirit of the agreement.
:
00:57:50,509 --> 00:57:52,844
We're gonna follow through
with it regardless of what the.
:
00:57:53,166 --> 00:57:57,046
The contract says, so you just, and those
assessments, I don't know how you make
:
00:57:57,046 --> 00:58:00,676
those assessments other than just dealing
with people a lot over an extended period
:
00:58:00,676 --> 00:58:01,916
of time and seeing how they operate.
:
00:58:02,536 --> 00:58:03,916
Getting older, I think probably helps.
:
00:58:04,604 --> 00:58:05,304
Mike Philbrick: Yeah, it is.
:
00:58:05,314 --> 00:58:10,251
It is a pretty consistent, theme, even
though they reiterated it this year.
:
00:58:10,321 --> 00:58:14,171
I, you know, I think that's been
a fairly consistent theme through
:
00:58:14,171 --> 00:58:18,031
the years, not only from them,
but, but from others who are.
:
00:58:18,526 --> 00:58:21,546
You know, sort of the, the
various lieutenants like Poorish.
:
00:58:21,556 --> 00:58:24,716
There's a, there's a, I think it's his
name, Poorish, the Indian guy who, you
:
00:58:24,716 --> 00:58:28,789
know, emulates a lot of the stuff he's,
you know, been on record as saying that
:
00:58:28,799 --> 00:58:32,057
being one of the more important factors
of, you know, you should fit it on one
:
00:58:32,057 --> 00:58:36,344
page because you, you can't contractually
obligate people away from bad behavior.
:
00:58:36,354 --> 00:58:38,004
If you have a bad actor,
you have a bad actor.
:
00:58:38,594 --> 00:58:40,624
Tobias Carlisle: mean, it's certainly
true in small cap world, right?
:
00:58:40,624 --> 00:58:44,594
There's a lot of small cap managers who
are, you know, owner operator is great
:
00:58:44,914 --> 00:58:49,679
unless the owner is sort of, Making
all of his returns through salary and,
:
00:58:49,749 --> 00:58:51,539
and option grants and things like that.
:
00:58:52,059 --> 00:58:54,389
Ideally you want, you know,
so Tesla is a good example.
:
00:58:54,389 --> 00:58:58,099
Like Musk's packages,
Musk's pay package is huge.
:
00:58:58,109 --> 00:59:02,462
That's like 50 billion kind of option
grant, which has been turned down.
:
00:59:02,852 --> 00:59:05,582
You know, you see that all the time in
the small and micro world where they
:
00:59:05,582 --> 00:59:09,082
get these big slugs of options and they
move all of the timing of it around.
:
00:59:09,802 --> 00:59:12,232
That behavior, you know, technically
it's legal, but don't want to
:
00:59:12,242 --> 00:59:13,352
be in business with a dude.
:
00:59:13,607 --> 00:59:14,477
Is someone who's doing that?
:
00:59:14,477 --> 00:59:15,067
Probably not.
:
00:59:15,837 --> 00:59:18,927
Now I want someone who wants to make
money with the shareholders as well.
:
00:59:18,927 --> 00:59:21,407
And that's sort of, that's, that's
where it's really important.
:
00:59:21,617 --> 00:59:25,327
Which I think you can, all of that is
observable in the financial statements
:
00:59:25,327 --> 00:59:26,607
and the proxies and things like that.
:
00:59:26,607 --> 00:59:30,077
I don't think you, you need to do any
like psychological analysis of the,
:
00:59:30,337 --> 00:59:31,757
the management or anything like that.
:
00:59:31,757 --> 00:59:35,117
I just think you look at the
financials and it tells you, you,
:
00:59:35,117 --> 00:59:36,287
don't have to listen to what they say.
:
00:59:36,944 --> 00:59:37,304
Mike Philbrick: Love it.
:
00:59:37,434 --> 00:59:40,962
So anything else from, uh, from, was
it, Noticeably different given that
:
00:59:40,962 --> 00:59:42,512
it was televised for the first time.
:
00:59:42,512 --> 00:59:44,572
Did you see any other, you know, sort of,
:
00:59:44,937 --> 00:59:45,997
Tobias Carlisle: it's
been televised before.
:
00:59:46,007 --> 00:59:47,967
It was very full, it was a very full year.
:
00:59:48,297 --> 00:59:49,437
Last year was less full.
:
00:59:50,107 --> 00:59:53,777
I like doing it because it's the one
place where if all the value guys who
:
00:59:53,777 --> 00:59:57,437
I know all gather together in one place
so we all catch up and Have dinner
:
00:59:57,437 --> 00:59:58,857
and drink and a few things like that.
:
00:59:58,857 --> 01:00:00,497
That's sort of the interesting one.
:
01:00:00,767 --> 01:00:02,437
My wife doesn't care
if I go to this thing.
:
01:00:02,667 --> 01:00:04,977
It's just, it's all
very, very nerdy dudes.
:
01:00:05,972 --> 01:00:07,502
Mike Philbrick: she went
once and she's like, never
:
01:00:07,527 --> 01:00:08,267
Tobias Carlisle: I should never go.
:
01:00:09,117 --> 01:00:09,867
No chance.
:
01:00:10,499 --> 01:00:12,059
Mike Philbrick: everyone
commiserating about, Oh, I
:
01:00:12,059 --> 01:00:14,409
bought my Berkshire back in::
01:00:14,419 --> 01:00:15,169
When did you buy
:
01:00:15,304 --> 01:00:15,894
Tobias Carlisle: a big part of it.
:
01:00:15,944 --> 01:00:16,894
That's a big part of it.
:
01:00:17,539 --> 01:00:18,119
Mike Philbrick: I love it.
:
01:00:18,659 --> 01:00:21,369
What a wonderful tribe created,
on that, you know, sort of.
:
01:00:21,969 --> 01:00:25,389
Buy and die type of, uh,
framework of, of ownership.
:
01:00:25,509 --> 01:00:25,839
It's,
:
01:00:26,114 --> 01:00:26,434
Tobias Carlisle: Yeah.
:
01:00:26,474 --> 01:00:27,754
it's it's a good, it's a good crew.
:
01:00:27,824 --> 01:00:28,804
It's a good group of people.
:
01:00:29,949 --> 01:00:32,049
Mike Philbrick: So you got, you,
you've, you've intimated you got a
:
01:00:32,049 --> 01:00:35,409
book maybe coming, so I don't know
if, if, if it doesn't go with the
:
01:00:35,414 --> 01:00:36,819
publisher, maybe you should self-publish.
:
01:00:36,819 --> 01:00:37,209
Man, it
:
01:00:37,294 --> 01:00:37,924
Tobias Carlisle: Well, I have self
:
01:00:37,934 --> 01:00:38,799
Mike Philbrick: a pretty neat book.
:
01:00:39,334 --> 01:00:40,564
Tobias Carlisle: I self
published the last one.
:
01:00:40,594 --> 01:00:41,894
I've got no problem self publishing.
:
01:00:41,894 --> 01:00:43,454
I just think this one
needs a little bit of help.
:
01:00:43,484 --> 01:00:47,067
So I'm trying to find a publisher who
can actually edit it a little bit.
:
01:00:47,077 --> 01:00:48,400
So it's with Harriman.
:
01:00:48,430 --> 01:00:51,180
Probably it's going to be with
Harriman, unless that falls over,
:
01:00:51,180 --> 01:00:52,480
in which case I'll self publish.
:
01:00:53,375 --> 01:00:53,915
Mike Philbrick: Nice.
:
01:00:53,980 --> 01:00:55,360
Richard Laterman: what's
the theme of the new book?
:
01:00:55,520 --> 01:00:56,650
What are you focused on?
:
01:00:57,240 --> 01:01:00,000
Tobias Carlisle: So it's, uh,
Sun Tzu and Warren Buffett.
:
01:01:00,565 --> 01:01:02,665
The overlap between the two philosophies.
:
01:01:02,945 --> 01:01:05,335
It sounds crazy, but I do think
there's a lot of overlap and
:
01:01:05,335 --> 01:01:05,795
Graham as
:
01:01:05,795 --> 01:01:06,055
well.
:
01:01:06,645 --> 01:01:07,615
There's a lot of overlap.
:
01:01:07,995 --> 01:01:10,205
I think Sun Tzu is a little
bit under appreciated.
:
01:01:10,205 --> 01:01:13,742
You know, Sun Tzu talks about following
the moral law, which is like an
:
01:01:13,752 --> 01:01:17,522
idea of like looking for character
and trying to do the right thing.
:
01:01:17,832 --> 01:01:20,572
And that's how you know, you're going to
succeed because you're doing the right
:
01:01:20,572 --> 01:01:23,202
thing and ultimately the bad guys fail.
:
01:01:23,242 --> 01:01:23,612
That's the.
:
01:01:25,325 --> 01:01:25,985
Mike Philbrick: love it.
:
01:01:26,070 --> 01:01:27,750
Richard Laterman: the battle
before it's even fought?
:
01:01:27,970 --> 01:01:28,800
Maybe there's a,
:
01:01:29,360 --> 01:01:29,510
an
:
01:01:29,600 --> 01:01:30,130
Tobias Carlisle: going to win it.
:
01:01:30,430 --> 01:01:30,700
Yeah,
:
01:01:30,720 --> 01:01:32,920
that's, I mean, that's, that's
such a big part of it, right?
:
01:01:32,960 --> 01:01:35,330
Like how many people buy stocks
because they've seen it going up.
:
01:01:35,547 --> 01:01:37,667
And then when it stops going up,
they don't know what they're doing.
:
01:01:37,667 --> 01:01:38,367
Like, that's the idea.
:
01:01:38,992 --> 01:01:42,412
You figured out how this thing's going
to play out before you buy it and you
:
01:01:42,412 --> 01:01:43,942
figure out how you can lose as well.
:
01:01:43,942 --> 01:01:46,512
And so when you start seeing the
signs of losing, then you get out.
:
01:01:47,225 --> 01:01:47,375
Mike Philbrick: Yeah.
:
01:01:47,430 --> 01:01:47,700
Richard Laterman: Oh, yeah.
:
01:01:47,700 --> 01:01:51,607
That's actually an interesting, sort
of portfolio construction question.
:
01:01:51,617 --> 01:01:54,467
Do you operate with any,
uh, level of stop losses?
:
01:01:54,657 --> 01:01:55,467
Uh,
:
01:01:55,615 --> 01:01:57,045
Tobias Carlisle: no, I would
buy them all the way down.
:
01:01:57,045 --> 01:01:58,405
And that happened with Meta as well.
:
01:01:58,405 --> 01:02:01,829
I started buying Meta at what I
thought was half value, and we
:
01:02:01,829 --> 01:02:03,219
were still buying at a third value.
:
01:02:03,539 --> 01:02:07,219
And I thought that the business itself,
you know, the, the business, again, it's
:
01:02:07,219 --> 01:02:10,389
one of those hard things where the stock
price was following the free cash flow
:
01:02:10,389 --> 01:02:13,659
generation, which was collapsing because
Musk was reinvesting in the Metaverse.
:
01:02:14,372 --> 01:02:18,482
And we're all sealed into that with
Musk as he flies it into the sun
:
01:02:18,482 --> 01:02:19,492
or whatever he was planning to do.
:
01:02:19,932 --> 01:02:23,952
But at some point he changed his mind and
decided that he's going to go turn it into
:
01:02:23,952 --> 01:02:25,842
cash flow generation and pay a dividend.
:
01:02:26,288 --> 01:02:27,269
it worked out okay.
:
01:02:27,804 --> 01:02:28,584
Richard Laterman: you're
talking about Meta
:
01:02:29,029 --> 01:02:29,819
Tobias Carlisle: yeah, meta.
:
01:02:30,030 --> 01:02:30,330
Richard Laterman: Zuckerberg,
:
01:02:30,855 --> 01:02:32,385
Tobias Carlisle: What did I say, Musk?
:
01:02:32,385 --> 01:02:32,655
Yeah, Zuckerberg, sorry.
:
01:02:32,655 --> 01:02:33,125
Zuck.
:
01:02:34,100 --> 01:02:34,520
Richard Laterman: exactly.
:
01:02:34,602 --> 01:02:37,872
Mike Philbrick: So outside of finance,
what any other hobbies that you're into?
:
01:02:38,157 --> 01:02:43,137
That would maybe surprise people, little,
little insight into this, Australian
:
01:02:43,147 --> 01:02:47,437
law, former lawyer, deep value investor
in the, in the heart of California.
:
01:02:47,902 --> 01:02:48,722
Tobias Carlisle: I play a lot of tennis.
:
01:02:48,982 --> 01:02:51,172
My wife's a former D1 tennis player.
:
01:02:51,172 --> 01:02:53,362
So, that's always humbling,
go and play some with her.
:
01:02:53,362 --> 01:02:55,102
And then, my kids play tennis as well.
:
01:02:55,112 --> 01:02:57,842
So we spend a lot of time at the
tennis courts, playing a lot of tennis.
:
01:02:58,372 --> 01:03:00,788
So that's, uh, I think
tennis is a great sport.
:
01:03:00,969 --> 01:03:03,709
Particularly for kids, because
it's, you know, the, to master
:
01:03:03,709 --> 01:03:05,199
the stroke is a difficult thing.
:
01:03:05,199 --> 01:03:07,089
Mechanically, to hit a
ball is a hard thing.
:
01:03:07,639 --> 01:03:10,009
But then it's hard to score.
:
01:03:10,009 --> 01:03:10,999
The scoring is crazy.
:
01:03:10,999 --> 01:03:15,459
15, 30, 40, deuce, add,
nuts, doesn't make any sense
:
01:03:15,544 --> 01:03:16,704
Mike Philbrick: Different tiebreakers.
:
01:03:17,249 --> 01:03:19,649
Tobias Carlisle: which side of the
court you stand on, who's serving,
:
01:03:19,669 --> 01:03:21,009
all that stuff is complicated.
:
01:03:21,019 --> 01:03:24,169
And then after you've mastered
the mechanical stuff and you've
:
01:03:24,169 --> 01:03:26,849
figured out where you've got to
stand, Then you have to work out
:
01:03:26,859 --> 01:03:28,169
how to beat somebody in a point.
:
01:03:28,179 --> 01:03:29,549
And that's the really hard stuff.
:
01:03:29,579 --> 01:03:30,949
And most people don't get to that point.
:
01:03:30,959 --> 01:03:31,159
So
:
01:03:31,913 --> 01:03:32,054
Richard Laterman: Have
:
01:03:32,059 --> 01:03:33,459
Tobias Carlisle: I want
my kids to master it.
:
01:03:34,163 --> 01:03:35,413
Richard Laterman: Have you
figured out how to beat her?
:
01:03:35,444 --> 01:03:39,384
Cause as a D1, former D1 player,
it sounds like she would, uh,
:
01:03:39,394 --> 01:03:40,924
she'd probably beat you most games.
:
01:03:40,924 --> 01:03:41,564
Is that
:
01:03:41,689 --> 01:03:43,509
Tobias Carlisle: you can't, you
can't rally with a D1 player.
:
01:03:43,519 --> 01:03:45,159
You're just going to get pissed up.
:
01:03:45,269 --> 01:03:49,519
So the only way to beat a D1 player as
a man is to serve and hit a hard serve.
:
01:03:49,879 --> 01:03:52,744
So I'm going to win the point
on the first point on the first.
:
01:03:53,044 --> 01:03:56,494
Stroke or on the third stroke when she
recovers or I'm not going to win it and
:
01:03:56,564 --> 01:03:57,044
Mike Philbrick: I love it.
:
01:03:57,334 --> 01:03:59,134
I serve, I return once and then I stop.
:
01:03:59,144 --> 01:04:00,194
Tobias Carlisle: that's it, that's it.
:
01:04:00,489 --> 01:04:01,319
Mike Philbrick: saved my energy.
:
01:04:01,329 --> 01:04:02,509
Otherwise they saved my energy.
:
01:04:03,124 --> 01:04:04,124
Tobias Carlisle: that's,
that's the only way.
:
01:04:04,194 --> 01:04:06,314
Cause once you get in there,
they, they love to rally.
:
01:04:06,334 --> 01:04:08,294
Like that's what they're, that's
what they're brought up on.
:
01:04:08,304 --> 01:04:09,274
They rally all the time.
:
01:04:09,284 --> 01:04:09,454
They
:
01:04:09,594 --> 01:04:10,344
hit these crazy
:
01:04:10,354 --> 01:04:10,634
Richard Laterman: Yeah.
:
01:04:10,874 --> 01:04:12,444
So you got to do the Pete Sampras thing.
:
01:04:12,874 --> 01:04:14,204
Tobias Carlisle: Serving, serving volley.
:
01:04:15,274 --> 01:04:15,544
Yeah.
:
01:04:15,544 --> 01:04:17,274
I'm a, I'm a, I say I'm a, I'm a Aussie.
:
01:04:17,274 --> 01:04:18,913
So I'm Pat Rafter serving volley
:
01:04:19,474 --> 01:04:19,913
style.
:
01:04:20,919 --> 01:04:21,709
Mike Philbrick: All right.
:
01:04:21,719 --> 01:04:23,219
So, I mean, that's awesome.
:
01:04:23,219 --> 01:04:23,829
Little tennis.
:
01:04:23,829 --> 01:04:26,038
I know you, uh, you were
at Indian, Indian Wells.
:
01:04:26,089 --> 01:04:27,079
My wife was there too.
:
01:04:27,079 --> 01:04:29,689
I'm surprised you guys didn't bump into
each other and you didn't know each other.
:
01:04:29,919 --> 01:04:32,559
Tobias Carlisle: it's a, it's a fun,
uh, it's, I recommend Indian Wells.
:
01:04:32,589 --> 01:04:34,459
It's a real party atmosphere.
:
01:04:34,459 --> 01:04:36,339
One of the, there are some
girls at the club, one of the
:
01:04:36,339 --> 01:04:37,469
girls at the club is a pro.
:
01:04:37,769 --> 01:04:39,949
Well, there's a few pros of the club,
but one of the pros was playing in the
:
01:04:39,949 --> 01:04:41,279
double too, and watched the doubles.
:
01:04:41,489 --> 01:04:42,599
Mike Philbrick: Oh, that, that's awesome.
:
01:04:42,609 --> 01:04:45,589
When you've got someone there that's,
uh, that, you know, that's even better.
:
01:04:45,788 --> 01:04:47,599
Tobias Carlisle: And doubles
is, doubles is exciting.
:
01:04:47,969 --> 01:04:50,679
So I don't know, it's like
less, I'm less worried for them.
:
01:04:50,679 --> 01:04:52,089
It's just the crowd's going bananas.
:
01:04:52,219 --> 01:04:54,538
It's more like a, any other
sort of sporting match.
:
01:04:54,538 --> 01:04:57,399
Whereas the, the singles is like, they
suck all the oxygen out of the room.
:
01:04:57,399 --> 01:05:00,099
Everybody's very stressed and
tense when the singles is going on.
:
01:05:00,329 --> 01:05:01,919
Mike Philbrick: No, one's
allowed to say anything.
:
01:05:01,949 --> 01:05:03,379
You can't even sneeze.
:
01:05:03,379 --> 01:05:06,259
Don't God, don't stand up and
change seats or something like that.
:
01:05:06,259 --> 01:05:06,489
You're going to
:
01:05:06,669 --> 01:05:08,159
Tobias Carlisle: There's a lot
of cheering in the doubles.
:
01:05:08,279 --> 01:05:08,749
It was cool.
:
01:05:08,874 --> 01:05:09,904
Mike Philbrick: Yeah, it is fun.
:
01:05:10,774 --> 01:05:11,334
That's awesome.
:
01:05:11,574 --> 01:05:16,564
Now, what about on the, uh, on the
personal side, any personal mantra
:
01:05:16,564 --> 01:05:21,009
or Last bit of investment advice
that you could share with everybody
:
01:05:21,009 --> 01:05:24,149
that's guided you through the ups
and downs of the investing world.
:
01:05:24,149 --> 01:05:25,639
Cause we're, we're about an hour.
:
01:05:25,639 --> 01:05:27,219
So we're, you know, starting to wrap.
:
01:05:27,399 --> 01:05:29,869
And, uh, what, what are the, you
know, you, and you, you, you've
:
01:05:29,869 --> 01:05:33,199
just, you know, penned a book
with Buffett and Sun Tzu in mind.
:
01:05:33,209 --> 01:05:37,904
So, I mean, there's gotta be some
fantastic, East Eastern wisdom
:
01:05:37,904 --> 01:05:40,145
coming out that you could, that
you could share with everybody
:
01:05:40,145 --> 01:05:41,275
that's going to change their lives.
:
01:05:42,089 --> 01:05:46,709
Tobias Carlisle: I really enjoyed, I, I
read Graham, uh, Intelligent Investor.
:
01:05:47,494 --> 01:05:48,404
years and years ago.
:
01:05:48,464 --> 01:05:52,954
And I read Sun Tzu many, many times over
the years, because I think it's very hard
:
01:05:52,964 --> 01:05:54,424
to understand the way that he writes.
:
01:05:55,144 --> 01:05:57,534
It's a translation from ancient
Chinese, and there are lots of
:
01:05:57,534 --> 01:06:00,934
different translations, and the
translators disagree in the best
:
01:06:00,934 --> 01:06:02,304
way to express some of these ideas.
:
01:06:02,304 --> 01:06:05,774
And they're vastly different between
the translations, the meaning.
:
01:06:06,134 --> 01:06:09,714
What I found is that there's
the original one, which was, um,
:
01:06:10,144 --> 01:06:13,554
written in:one that most people have read.
:
01:06:13,594 --> 01:06:16,154
And I think that's probably
the best one, but there's also.
:
01:06:16,419 --> 01:06:20,509
One that came out in:which is looking at the Taoist
:
01:06:20,549 --> 01:06:23,679
influence of the Art of War.
:
01:06:24,109 --> 01:06:26,959
And I think that, and I had never
really had any exposure to that so
:
01:06:26,969 --> 01:06:32,730
I went and read the Tao Te Ching
and the I Ching and the Zhuangzi
:
01:06:32,740 --> 01:06:33,870
and a few of those other things.
:
01:06:33,910 --> 01:06:37,110
And I was kind of blown away by
the, there's some interesting
:
01:06:37,120 --> 01:06:37,910
wisdom in those things.
:
01:06:37,910 --> 01:06:42,480
And a lot of it is about patience
and letting things sort of unfold
:
01:06:42,490 --> 01:06:43,540
the way that they should unfold.
:
01:06:43,540 --> 01:06:46,510
And I think that that's
very apt for investing.
:
01:06:47,290 --> 01:06:51,520
And one of them, one of them that stands
out for me that Richard sort of alluded
:
01:06:51,520 --> 01:06:53,300
to it earlier, but you should, you should.
:
01:06:54,150 --> 01:06:59,090
Have a good enough understanding of your
subject matter and what's going to happen
:
01:06:59,317 --> 01:07:03,067
in this sort of engagement when you're
putting these positions on that you should
:
01:07:03,077 --> 01:07:07,137
be able to read the signs of it going
badly or going well, which is distinct
:
01:07:07,147 --> 01:07:08,417
from what the stock price is doing.
:
01:07:08,827 --> 01:07:10,677
Cause the stock price is
a little bit misleading.
:
01:07:10,677 --> 01:07:12,667
I think that's how other
people feel about it.
:
01:07:13,067 --> 01:07:15,837
What's actually happening in the
business is revealed internally.
:
01:07:15,837 --> 01:07:19,277
And that's what the Dow and
Sun Tzu would say as well.
:
01:07:19,277 --> 01:07:21,977
You look internally, ignore the surface.
:
01:07:22,387 --> 01:07:26,562
I think that The Tao begins,
the Tao begins something like,
:
01:07:26,639 --> 01:07:28,679
caught in the, caught in desire.
:
01:07:28,679 --> 01:07:33,712
You, you see only the, you know, you
see only the surface, but if you can see
:
01:07:33,802 --> 01:07:38,102
the mystery and you, you sort of, if you
can see inside, you can see the mystery.
:
01:07:38,102 --> 01:07:39,502
And that's what I, that's what I want.
:
01:07:39,502 --> 01:07:41,882
I want to see the mystery, you
know, I want to see what's going on.
:
01:07:42,547 --> 01:07:43,407
Mike Philbrick: All the answers lie
:
01:07:43,432 --> 01:07:44,082
Tobias Carlisle: the surface.
:
01:07:44,342 --> 01:07:44,932
That's it.
:
01:07:45,487 --> 01:07:46,837
Richard Laterman: Very poetic way to end.
:
01:07:46,857 --> 01:07:47,857
I want to see the mystery.
:
01:07:47,857 --> 01:07:48,367
I like that.
:
01:07:48,417 --> 01:07:49,217
That's a great phrasing.
:
01:07:49,859 --> 01:07:50,569
Tobias Carlisle: I think it's reality.
:
01:07:50,579 --> 01:07:51,389
You want to see reality.
:
01:07:51,389 --> 01:07:52,319
You want to see the mystery.
:
01:07:52,667 --> 01:07:53,387
The generator.
:
01:07:54,214 --> 01:07:57,014
Mike Philbrick: Well, everyone,
that's another hour on ReSolve Riffs.
:
01:07:57,784 --> 01:08:01,364
Toby Carlisle, Acquires Funds, Zig Deep.
:
01:08:01,504 --> 01:08:02,484
Those are the tickers.
:
01:08:03,014 --> 01:08:04,074
They are smashing it.
:
01:08:04,204 --> 01:08:05,924
this hour went, flew by.
:
01:08:06,124 --> 01:08:08,894
Uh, Tobias, always a pleasure
catching up with you and, uh,
:
01:08:08,894 --> 01:08:10,194
and, and sitting and chatting.
:
01:08:10,194 --> 01:08:11,604
And, uh, thanks so much for taking
:
01:08:11,764 --> 01:08:12,204
the time.
:
01:08:12,694 --> 01:08:12,884
Tobias Carlisle: Yeah.
:
01:08:12,884 --> 01:08:13,704
thanks for having me, gents.
:
01:08:14,184 --> 01:08:14,734
Thanks, Richard.
:
01:08:14,734 --> 01:08:15,214
Thanks, Michael.
:
01:08:15,214 --> 01:08:17,163
It's really, it's always great
catching up with you guys.
:
01:08:17,234 --> 01:08:17,874
Good seeing you.